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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Despite being conceived as a ‘theory of rational choice’, orthodox
economics fails to ascribe to human beings the ability to choose in a
meaningful sense, something philosophical approaches to economics have
long noted and tried to remedy. Tony Lawson’s critical realism is one attempt
at a remedy. If, following Lawson, one conceives of choice as a ‘capacity’ of
human beings, critical realist analysis suggests a distinction between humans’
possession and their exercise of this capacity. If one can sustain this distinction,
one should be able to distinguish cases in which agents actually exercise
their capacity to choose from those in which they do not. Investigation of
this distinction does not, however, lead to the desired distinction between
such cases. Consequently, a reformulation of the notion of choice is required.
An implication for economic theory – namely, the possibility of
conceptualizing ‘exploitation’ – is discussed.
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
In his analysis of choice, Tony Lawson tries to tread a path between the
philosophical poles of ‘determinism’ and ‘free-will’. Central to his critical realist
ontology is a distinction between an agent’s possession of a capacity (or power) to
act and the exercise of this capacity. Applied to human choice, the distinction
should allow us to distinguish between individuals’ possession of the capacity to
choose and their exercise of this capacity. This would allow us to conceptualise
choice without proposing that it be ubiquitous. In other words, the distinction
between the exercise and the possession (but non-exercise) of the capacity to
choose holds out the prospect of ontologically rooting a distinction betweenMark S. Peacock 16
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situations in which an agent may be said to choose and those in which she does
not. This essay explores the possibilities embedded in the exercise/possession
distinction and asks how far it can take us in the search for a theory of choice.
Various interpretations of the distinction are discussed but none is adequate to
the task, and so an alternative is offered. The alternative points us towards a way
of conceptualizing ‘exploitation’.
The power to choose The power to choose The power to choose The power to choose The power to choose
Amongst critical realists, Tony Lawson’s work is noteworthy for its detailed
analysis of choice. [1] Indeed, choice is the premise of Lawson’s social ontology.
The premise is of strategic import in the field of economics which is widely held
to be based on a ‘theory of (rational) choice’. Lawson (1997: 9, 30) argues that
economists’ ‘theory of choice’ allows the agents it models little leeway to make
anything worth calling a ‘choice’. Let us consider the notion of rational choice
to ascertain how much freedom of choice orthodox economics attributes to
agents.
A plausible reconstruction of agents’ freedom to choose in orthodox economic
theory is as follows. Any agent’s freedom to choose is constrained. ‘Constraints’ in
rational choice theory resemble a perimeter or boundary outside of which the
choices of an individual cannot step; for instance, if $100,000 stands at my
disposal, I cannot choose acts of consumption which involve expenditure beyond
this; my choices are constrained by the feasible set of options which cost
$100,000 or less. However, within this feasible set, an individual is ‘free’ to
choose whichever consumption bundle accords with her strongest preference.
Presented thus, the agent of rational choice theory would seem to possess
absolute freedom of choice within the feasible set but no freedom to choose a
consumption bundle beyond it. Lawson (1997: 8-9) challenges this presentation
of orthodox theory. He argues that orthodox economics conceives of choice, even
within the feasible set, as something dictated by an agent’s preferences; her
preferences determine the choice. And if agents’ preferences determine their
choice in this way, orthodox economics cannot be held to model agents so that
they may be said to ‘choose’ in a meaningful way, let alone ‘freely’; rather, their
choices are, as it were, pre-programmed by their preferences. To defend the role
of freedom of choice in orthodox economics, one could cast it philosophically as
a form of compatibilism. According to compatibilism, the determination of theThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 17
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agent’s ‘will’ is compatible with freedom. That is, ‘freedom’ to choose is
compatible with the determination of the agent’s choice by her preferences. We
may, according to the compatibilist, speak of ‘unfreedom’ only if an agent’s
course of action is determined by forces external to her, e.g., if she is coerced by
another person to perform action X, or if some drug is administered to the agent
which makes her act in a particular way. Thomas Hobbes (1968/1651: 189) offers
a classical account of compatibilism when he describes freedom to consist in ‘the
absence of externall Impediments’ to action. But if external impediments are
absent, compatibilists hold an agent’s action to be ‘free’ even if it is ‘internally’
(that is, psychologically) determined by preferences, desires or inclination.
Lawson rejects the compatibilism of rational choice theory. Its compatibilism
follows from the theory’s ‘deductivist’ structure (Lawson 1997: 16-20); that is, the
goal of rational choice theory is to deduce unique choices of individuals from
their preferences and the constraints facing them. Once a deductivist structure is
seen to be desirable to the theory, any notion of choice, according to Lawson, is
merely apparent, for agents have no scope to do other than that dictated to them
by their preferences. For Lawson, neither external impediment nor internal
determination of action is compatible with freedom of choice.
Lawson provides good grounds for reconceptualising choice if we are to rescue
the notion from the ruins of orthodox economics. As a preface to examining his
alternative, I propose one desideratum of a theory of choice, namely, that it be
able to conceptualize two different types of situation: those in which agents do
not have choice; and those in which they do. This would allow a theory of choice
to make sense of the everyday linguistic formulation: ‘I didn’t have any choice’,
which someone says of herself after performing a (usually regrettable) action.
Critical realism’s distinction between the possession of a capacity to choose and
the exercise of this capacity holds out the prospect of making sense of this
distinction; for people who say they had ‘no choice’ could be conceived as those
who possess but do not exercise their capacity to choose in a given situation,
whereas people who do choose both possess and exercise this capacity.
Furthermore, paths to human emancipation would take the form of giving those
who currently have no choice in certain situations the ability to exercise choice
in such situations. In what follows, I investigate how far critical realism brings
us in conceiving choice adequately.Mark S. Peacock 18
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Agents, powers and their exercise Agents, powers and their exercise Agents, powers and their exercise Agents, powers and their exercise Agents, powers and their exercise
Lawson (1997: 9, 21, 174) conceives choice as a ‘power’ (or ‘capacity’, ‘potential’ or
‘capability’ to act); ‘any individual’ who possesses this power ‘could always have
acted otherwise’. With this, Lawson tries to banish determinism. A ‘power’ is
possessed by an ‘agent’ by virtue of that agent’s ‘structure’. When activated, this
power, in conjunction with others, has a causal influence on events. When it is
not activated, the power is possessed by the agent but is unexercised and therefore
does not influence events (or only does so by the absence of its exercise).
This ontological picture was first worked out by Roy Bhaskar for the natural
world. In line with critical realism’s ‘naturalism’ (i.e., the view that the methods
for studying the natural world are broadly applicable to the study of the social
world), Lawson repeatedly draws analogies and illustrates his arguments with
examples from the natural world. In what follows, I explore one such analogy to
see how far it takes us in understanding choice. I should note, before
commencing this investigation, that, by using such analogies, Lawson does not
hold the social world to be homologous to its natural counterpart; rather he tries
to shed light on the social world using familiar examples from natural science as
an aid to understanding. Indeed, his work is peppered with illustrations from the
natural world involving autumn leaves and the effect of gravity, the conductivity
of copper, and cows with a disease which makes them ‘mad’ (Lawson 1997: 21, 22,
28-9, 123, 221, 227). As with all analogies, the one I explore forthwith has
limits, and my explanation aims to make these limits clear. The analogy
concerns gunpowder: a sample of gunpowder has a molecular structure which
gives it the ability (power) to cause explosions; the gunpowder possesses this
power whether or not the power is activated; the power can be activated if one
ignites the gunpowder, but if it is not ignited, gunpowder nevertheless possesses
the power to cause explosions although it might currently be in an inert (non-
activated) state (Lawson 1997: 21). One may ask whether, in analogy to
gunpowder, one can distinguish an individual’s possession of the power to choose
from its exercise.
The case of choice
In the case of choice, the ‘agent’ is a human being who, by virtue of her
structure, possesses the power to choose. This power is the individual’s ability toThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 19
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have done other than she actually did: ‘if under conditions x an agent in fact
chose to do y, it is the case that this same agent could really instead have not
done y’ (Lawson 1997: 30). How are we to conceive the difference between the
possession of a power to choose (analogous to gunpowder’s ability to cause
explosions) and the exercise of this ability (analogous to the igniting of
gunpowder and its actually tending to cause explosions)? As a thought
experiment, I offer, in what follows, a ‘strict naturalist’ interpretation of the
possession/exercise distinction by comparing humans’ ability to choose and
gunpowder’s ability to cause explosions. First, though, I wish to consider one
way in which Lawson does not conceive the distinction. He does not say the
following:
At time t, an agent, A, activates her power to choose and hence performs
an action, Φ; after time t, she can no longer activate her power to choose
with regard to Φ because Φ is over and done, it belongs to the past, and
cannot be undone or chosen differently. Hence, at the time of acting, an
agent is able to do otherwise, but after t, it is impossible for A to do other
than she did at t.
If he conceived the distinction thus, Lawson would merely be stating the obvious
fact that we cannot change the past, for the past is irrevocably and indisputably
determined once we view it from the present. Conceptualizing the distinction
between the possession and the exercise of the power to choose in this way would
be equivalent to (and no more exciting than) saying that a particular sample of
gunpowder exploded yesterday and hence that sample (today) no longer has the
power not to explode yesterday. Lawson is looking for something more
significant than this; his interest is in choices we are making or will make, not
in those we have made. And so we return to the question: How are we to conceive
the difference between individuals’ possession of the power to choose and their
exercise of this power?
Let us, then, turn to the strict naturalist interpretation of the distinction.
Presumably the actualization of a person’s ability to choose lies in her acting,
because when a person acts, ‘in any situation, he or she could really have acted
other than he or she did’ (Lawson 1997: 174). Let us compare gunpowder and
human beings to appreciate the distinction I am pursuing. The general form of
the relationship between the powers of an ‘agent’ (meaning all and not just
human agents) and the exercise of those powers is as follows:Mark S. Peacock 20
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1a) X (the agent) possesses a structure, S, which gives it the power to Y.
1b) The exercise of this power means that X tends to cause Y. [2]
Applied to gunpowder we have:
2a) Gunpowder possesses a structure which gives it the power to cause
explosions.
2b) The exercise of this power means that gunpowder tends to cause
explosions.
Applied to the human individual we would say, in exact analogy:
3a) A human being possesses a structure which gives her the power to
have done other than she actually did.
3b) The exercise of that power means that she tends to have done other
than she actually did.
This cannot be what Lawson means, for we have gone astray with 3b): nobody
has ever done (or tended to do) other than they did (or tended to do) in a given
situation. 3b) reveals a familiar logical problem encountered in attempts to
refute determinism (Nesbitt and Candlish 1978: 417 note 2). If we wish to refute
determinism, though, we do not have to show that a person is capable of the
impossible feat of doing what she did and simultaneously doing otherwise (i.e.,
doing x and not doing x at the same time); rather, we need to show that agents
are capable of doing other than they did instead of doing what they did at any
particular time.
This logical problem arises if we take naturalism too literally and thus draw too
close an analogy between cases like gunpowder’s ability to cause explosions and
humans’ ability to do other than they did. The crucial difference between the two
cases is that the exercise of humans’ power to choose consists in a counterfactual
(the ability to have done other than she actually did); in contrast, the exercise of
gunpowder’s power to cause explosions consists in an identifiable causal tendency
(to cause explosions) – a ‘factual’ rather than a counterfactual, as it were. If we
consider the converses of 2b) and 3b), the problem becomes particularly clear:
2b)’ the non-exercise of gunpowder’s power to cause explosions entails that
it did not tend to cause an explosion.
3b)’ the non-exercise of humans’ power of choice entails that the
individual did not tend to do other than she did.The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 21
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In 3b)’, ‘not tending to have done other than she did’ simply means tending to
have done what she did (if we cancel the double negatives – ‘not’ and ‘other’); but
‘tending to have done what one did’ is the trivial empirical description of what
human beings always do. We have not learned anything useful about human
beings here in the way that we have learned something about gunpowder when
we distinguish the possession and the exercise of its ability to cause explosions.
The analogy between gunpowder’s power to cause explosions and humans’ power
to choose is not close enough to shed light on the latter. This could be one reason
Lawson (1997: 60, 223) supports only a ‘qualified naturalism’. We must therefore
rule out this strict naturalist interpretation of what Lawson means and
conceptualise the distinction between possessing and exercising the ability to
choose in a different way.
A posteriori identification of causal powers
Let us pursue a variation of our gunpowder plot and ask how we find out about
gunpowder’s causal powers. According to transcendental realism, scientists
ascertain the structure of an agent through empirical investigation. From the
agent’s structure, scientists deduce its causal powers (an ability to cause
explosions being one such power in the case of gunpowder). The identification of
this structure reveals the agent’s ‘real essence’ by virtue of which it possesses its
causal powers. After the a posteriori identification of the agent’s structure,
anything answering correctly to the name by which we describe the agent (be it
gunpowder, nickel or carbon monoxide) must possess the causal powers identified
in empirical investigation (Bhaskar 1978: 209-10, 214). So, in the case of human
choice, rather than starting with what agents do (i.e., choose), we could try to
identify (empirically) humans’ real essence, i.e., what structures they possess by
virtue of which they necessarily possess certain causal powers like the power to
choose.
Lawson (1997: 31) seems to hold that he proceeds along these lines, for he states
that he derives the existence of choice ‘ex posteriori’ (sic). [3] Yet it is hard to
find a derivation of choice in his work which proceeds from empirical
investigation. Sometimes he simply asserts that people possess the power to
choose, e.g., in the question: ‘what is implied by the reality of people making
choices?’ (Lawson 1997: 30) Sometimes he treats the existence of choice
conditionally, e.g., in the question: ‘if choice is real any agent could always have
done otherwise’ (Lawson 1997: 9, 30; 1994: 269). Finally, he sometimes drawsMark S. Peacock 22
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support for the reality of choice from economists’ acknowledgement of ‘an
intuition that human beings possess the capacity of exercising real choice’
(Lawson 1997: 8). Thus he describes choice as a ‘convenient, widely accepted’
feature of human behaviour and deduces his social ontology using the existence
of choice as a premise (Lawson 1997: 9, 56, 175). None of these strategies
constitutes the sort of scientific investigation which Bhaskar envisages when he
describes how scientists derive the powers of natural agents like gunpowder.
Lawson’s first strategy is just an assertion; the second addresses choice only as a
hypothetical given without substantiating it; strategy three appeals to an
everyday ‘intuition’ about choice, but a scientific realist cannot rely on lay
intuitions if a distinction between scientific knowledge and everyday belief or
intuition is to be maintained; relying on economists’ acknowledgement of choice
is also unstable support for choice, especially in light of Lawson’s well aimed
criticisms of economists’ scientific credentials. Can we improve on these
derivations of choice?
What would an empirical investigation of human beings look like if it were to
allow us to identify their structure and deduce therefrom their power to choose?
One possibility is that we observe people’s behaviour in the hope that we could
deduce their power to choose from it. But however long we watched, we would
not see any person ‘doing other than he actually did’, and hence it is hard to see
how we could observe anything which would allow us to deduce that humans
possess a power enabling them to do other than they actually do. If we are to
deduce causal powers in the way Bhaskar envisages, however, we need some
empirical pointer (equivalent to gunpowder’s actually causing explosions) which
would lead us to infer the existence of such a power. An alternative might be to
observe something inside human beings themselves (not their outward behaviour)
by virtue of which we could deduce their power to choose. We might, for
instance, find something by virtue of which humans possessed a ‘free will’ which
enabled them to do otherwise. There are two drawbacks with this approach:
(a) Those who, hitherto, have looked deepest ‘inside’ people (i.e., cognitive
scientists) are usually the firmest deniers of the existence of free will.
Hence, relying on ‘empirical scientific investigation’ might not yield
results amenable to those, like Lawson, who combat determinism.
(b) We are in danger of confusing a philosophical issue with an
empirical one; for whatever we discover lurking in human beings will
only allow us to settle the issue of free will and determinism if thisThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 23
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issue is an empirical one. Traditionally, discussion of free will and
determinism has been a metaphysical pursuit, and therefore not one
which will be settled by empirical investigation.
Lawson, sensibly, does not suggest that one deduce humans’ power to choose from
an empirically identified structure of humans. Instead, it is by philosophical fiat
that he resolves the issue: he declares the capacity of choice to be ‘analytic’ to the
notion of ‘intentional human agency’ (Lawson 1997: 56). An empirical problem
thus disappears and is replaced by a conceptually necessary relation. [4] The only
grounds Lawson offers for stipulating this relation are those of everyday
plausibility. That Lawson does not try to establish empirically that human
beings possess the capacity of choice might relate to the constructive role the
concept of choice plays in his work; for the existence of choice forms the premise
for his deduction that the social world be ‘open’, and, being a premise, it might
be held to lie beyond justification (Lawson 1997: 30). Nevertheless a social
ontology is only as good as the premise from which it is derived, and hence we
require more than intuitive plausibility, convenience or the stipulation of an
analytical relation between intentional human agency and choice if we are to
ground the distinction between the possession and exercise of humans’ power to
choose. Lawson’s analytic relation, with its mention of intentionality, gives us a
lead in conceptualizing the distinction between possessing the power to choose
and exercising it.
Intentionality and choice
One could try to distinguish the possession of our power to choose from its
exercise in a different way. If, as Lawson holds, the capacity of choice is
analytic to the notion of intentional human agency (Lawson 1997: 56), perhaps
we can distinguish intentional actions from non-intentional behaviour as a way
of getting to the distinction between actions in which choice is exercised and
actions in which it is not; for in light of the analytic relation between
intentionality and choice, the power to choose must be exercised in intentional
actions but not in non-intentional behaviour. Terminological caution is
required: ‘actions’, for Lawson, are by definition intentional – they are goal-
directed and done for reasons (Lawson 1997: 174; 2003: 47-8). ‘Actions’ therefore
involve choice. ‘Behaviour’, on the other hand, is not necessarily intentional. Can
‘non-intentional behaviour’ lead us to a distinction between the possession and
the exercise of the power to choose?Mark S. Peacock 24
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The converse of Lawson’s analytic relation between choice and intentional
action implies that non-intentional behaviour involves no choice. Consequently,
the set of non-intentional behaviour will be coterminous with behaviour in
which choice is not exercised. To make the distinction, though, we must
distinguish behaviour which is intentional (‘actions’) from that which is not.
Lawson’s work is ambiguous on this matter. He asks whether ‘all human
behaviour or human doings can correctly be described as intentional’; his answer
is that it ‘can mostly be described as an action [and therefore as intentional]
under some description’ (Lawson 1997: 175). Alternatively, he writes: ‘Most
human behaviour appears to be intentional under some description, although not
all things done in an act, and certainly not all the consequences of it, need, or
typically will be, intended’ (Lawson 1997: 175). If we can identify a set of human
behaviour which is non-intentional, and hence one in which choice is not
exercised, we might claim that this set involves behaviour by agents who possess
the capacity to choose but do not exercise it. Let us explore the matter more
closely.
One can easily think of examples of non-intentional behaviour: involuntary
twitches of the arm, an increase in one’s heart-rate whilst jogging, stertorous
breathing in one’s sleep and even somnambulation may be deemed non-
intentional under any description; hence they all answer to the description of
‘behaviour’ but not ‘action’ which means they do not involve choice. The problem
with such examples is that they are not of great social scientific import. If, of
course, non-intentional behaviour has implications for action, it becomes social
scientifically interesting (e.g., an increased incidence of snoring amongst
married men might lead to a high divorce rate). But non-intentional behaviour
only becomes interesting because it impinges on the realm of action which is
intentional and involves choice. And if non-intentional behaviour is the realm
of people who possess but do not exercise the capacity to choose, it does not have
an obvious bearing on social phenomena.
Bhaskar (1989: 105) gets us a little closer to social scientifically interesting
phenomena which do not involve choice when he distinguishes things which
people do (‘actions’) from things which happen to people. Let us now ask whether
things which happen to people are such that the people to whom they happen do
not exercise their capacity to choose. If people to whom things happen possess but
do not exercise the capacity to choose, we have arrived at the distinction we haveThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 25
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sought all along – between possessing and exercising the capacity to choose. Let
us explore an example.
Anthony Giddens (1982: 31) invites us to conceive a person, A, who injects
another, B, with a drug which immobilises B and renders her unconscious; A
thus has B entirely under his control and can do anything to B. Something has
obviously ‘happened’ to B, and in her immobilised state, further things might
happen to her. B, furthermore, cannot exercise her capacity to choose. Does this
give us the distinction between exercising and possessing this capacity? Giddens
thinks not. He holds that B, when she is drugged, is not an ‘agent’ at all: not
only does she not act; she cannot act (‘acting’, for Giddens, involving what it does
for Lawson, namely an ability to have done otherwise). Consequently, B not only
cannot exercise her capacity to choose when she is drugged; it is not obvious that
she even possesses this capacity when drugged. Only when she returns to her
normal state may we say of B that she possesses this capacity. Should we accept
Giddens’ conceptualization and thus relinquish the distinction between
possessing and exercising the capacity to choose in this example?
One could argue against Giddens’ interpretation by claiming that B is an agent
whose causal power to act intentionally and with volition has merely been put
out of service by the drug. This is different from saying that, whilst drugged, B
is dispossessed of this capacity. Those who resist Giddens’ interpretation would
thus characterise B as possessing but not exercising the capacity to choose,
rather as one might say that someone possesses the ability to swim even though
he is currently reading a book in a café. An adherent of Giddens’ interpretation,
though, may counter that B and the swimmer who is reading are different cases:
the swimmer can ‘switch on’ (that is, exercise) his ability to swim at any time
(assuming there is water nearby in which he can swim); B, on the other hand,
cannot ‘switch on’ her agency (and hence her ability to choose) without
undergoing a change of state; whilst she is drugged, she is not a human agent
and only becomes one through a change of state (from an unconscious, drugged
to a conscious human being). The issue is important for critical realism’s
depiction of ‘agents’ and their possession of powers, and it impinges on the
following examples:
1) Does gunpowder possess the power to cause explosions when it is wet?
2) Does a dog possess the ability to bite when it is muzzled?
3) Does a sample of water to which salt has been added possess the power to boil
at 100°C?Mark S. Peacock 26
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Negative answers to all three questions could be justified because, to (re)possess
their respective powers, each of the three agents would have to undergo a change
of state (just as B would if she is to possess the capacity to choose again): the
gunpowder would have to be dried, the dog’s muzzle taken off, and the water
desalinated. As described in the above questions, the ‘gunpowder’ is not
gunpowder but wet gunpowder, and wet gunpowder does not have the power to
cause explosions; the ‘dog’ not a dog but a muzzled dog which does not have the
capacity to bite; and the ‘water’ not water but saline solution the boiling point of
which exceeds 100°C. Similarly, B in Giddens’ example is not a person but a
drugged one; were the drug to have permanent effect or make her fall into a
coma, it would indeed be plausible to say that B would never again possess the
power to choose, for she is no longer an agent. For present purposes, though, I
remain agnostic about the correct characterization of B. The reason for my
agnosticism is that Giddens’ example is extreme and of marginal significance to
the social sciences. Although I see Bhaskar’s ‘things which happen to people’ as
being of import to social analysis, Giddens’ example does not take us very far
here. Giddens recognises this himself; indeed, the purpose of his example is to
show that cases of apparent ‘absolute power’ (as A’s power over B seems to be
when B is drugged) are not useful in conceptualizing power in social
relationships. If A is to have power over B, then B must be able to do something
which A can use to his own advantage; in B’s immobilized state, A’s ‘power’ over
B is useless to A. Meaningful power relationships, Giddens (1979: 149) argues,
are always reciprocal, for they always involve B acting (doing something) and
hence entail that B retain a modicum of power herself with which to do the
things A wishes her to do. This thought leads us to a different example of
something which happens to people.
Gerry Cohen (1988: 245) asks us to imagine a person, Smith, who wants another,
Jones, to leave the room. Cohen compares two ways in which Smith can bring
this about:
Scenario a): Smith drags Jones to the door and pushes Jones out.
Scenario b): Smith threatens to shoot Jones unless he leaves, whereupon
Jones leaves the room.
In scenario a), Cohen argues, Jones does not ‘do’ anything because he cannot be
said to have ‘chosen’ to leave. Cohen’s ‘doing something’ is thus equivalent to
Lawson’s ‘acting’ in that it necessarily involves intentionality and choice. But
Smith’s manhandling of Jones, Cohen holds, does not mean that Jones isThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 27
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prevented from exercising his power to choose; rather, he does not possess the
power to choose because he does not do anything in scenario a). Instead,
something happens to him. In scenario b), by contrast, Jones does something; he
leaves of his own volition; that is, he chooses to leave.
Let us consider scenario a) in more detail. Note first, that, unlike Giddens’ B,
Jones, when he is dragged and pushed out of the room, is fully conscious but
unable to resist Smith. Jones is thus more like an agent than Giddens’ B. Jones,
though, is physically overpowered by Smith. Physical overpowering might have
application in the social sciences but, once again, we may contest its significance
in social life. Although it certainly occurs, it is marginal compared to another
concept to which I wish to contrast it, namely force. Consider some examples of
people of whom we say that they are forced to do something:
v) workers can be forced to take poorly paid and dangerous jobs;
w) immigrants might be forced to live in undesirable parts of a city;
x) artists are forced to pander to commercial pressure rather than produce works
which they think worthy of the name ‘art’;
y) economists are forced to analyse the social world using mathematical methods
in order to get their work published in journals considered reputable by
most economists.
Common to these examples is that those described do something they would
rather avoid. More generally, people are forced to do things when they have two
or more options facing them, neither (or none) of which is a desirable option.
And because they are confronted with options (all undesirable), those depicted in
the examples choose to do what they do. People who are physically overpowered,
by contrast, are not faced with options and hence do not choose.
Returning to Smith and Jones, Cohen holds that only of scenario b) (Jones
leaving the room after Smith threatens to shoot him) should we say that Jones
was forced to leave the room. Being forced to do x is not only compatible with
exercising one’s power to choose to do x; exercising one’s power to choose to do x
is actually a presupposition of being forced to do it (Cohen 1988: 241, 145). There
is a prima facie paradox, here, because choosing to do x and being forced to do it
are apparently mutually antithetical. Not so, argues Cohen, because, in scenario
b), Jones is ‘doing’ something (that is, ‘acting’, in Lawson’s sense – intentionally
and with volition), which is not the case in scenario a). The paradox disappearsMark S. Peacock 28
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if we conceive ‘being forced’ as an action. What makes leaving a room after being
threatened an action is that Jones has two options: (i) staying put and being shot
(assuming that Smith will carry out his threat), and (ii) leaving the room. If
Jones selects option (ii), he not only leaves; he chooses to do so. If we compare
Jones to the drugged, immobilized and unconscious person of Giddens’ example,
the drugged person cannot be forced to do anything because, in her drugged
state, she cannot do anything at all; hence she cannot choose between options.
Hence, although A’s control over the drugged B is, in one sense, absolute, A
cannot use this control to her advantage because, to attain that control, she has
had to put B into a state of complete uselessness (Giddens 1982: 31); A can no
longer force B to do an action, x, because to be forced to do x, B must be able to
do x; and to be able to do x requires that B can choose to do x.
Of the class of cases in which things happen to people, then, there is a subset in
which people are forced to do something; Jones being threatened is something
which happens to him and he is forced to leave the room. Those who are forced
both possess and exercise the capacity to choose which is what makes such
choices unpleasant. The distinction between possessing and exercising the
capacity to choose is therefore not relevant to such cases, for it is not the case
that those who are forced to do something possess but do not exercise the power
to choose, whilst others, who are not forced, do exercise this power. Neither is
the distinction between non-intentional and intentional behaviour of relevance
because Jones, when he is forced to leave the room, acts intentionally.
Two objections to this position come to mind:
(i) By holding that the distinction between possessing and exercising the
power to choose is not relevant to cases of force, we are in danger of
neglecting this distinction altogether, at least for the purpose of
social theoretic analysis. This might disturb critical realists for
whom the possession/exercise distinction is embedded in their
ontology.
(ii) We must ask whether an account of ‘force’ which ascribes a ‘choice’ to
agents is discerning enough to ground a distinction between people
who choose and are forced to do something, and people who choose
but are not forced; for we are in danger of concluding that, even when
we are forced to do something, we choose to do it, and hence there is
no essential difference between people in this respect – we are all ‘free
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Regarding (i), the elision of the possession/exercise distinction in the realm of
human choice does not pose a challenge to the critical realist ontology. That is,
even if we hold that human beings, qua ‘agents’, always exercise (and never
merely possess) their power to choose in everything they do, we are not denying
the distinction between the exercise and possession of powers. As Lawson
(personal communication) writes, it is not anomalous to critical realism’s social
ontology to hold that some powers must be exercised if the agent to whom those
powers belong is to exist at all. As an example, he cites the heart’s exercising its
capacity to pump blood which is a presupposition of its ability to exist (as a
functioning heart). Similarly, to be a human agent (that is, one who acts), a
person must exercise her power to choose. What would be a mistake, according to
Lawson, would be to assume of certain powers that they are always exercised
when in fact they are not. This is the criticism he levels at neoclassical
economics which holds that a human being’s capacity to choose rationally is
exercised in all human action. This, Lawson holds, is false, for the exercise of
rational choice is not a presupposition of the existence of human agents; choices,
although they can be rational, are not always so. Elsewhere, Lawson (1997: 62,
106) refers to this as the error of ‘actualism’, that is, reducing a capacity which
can (but does not have to) be exercised to the actualization of that capacity.
The second objection raises the following point which we should try to avoid: if
everybody who performs action x exercises choice in doing so (including people
who are forced to do x), it seems that we are all free to do x whether or not we
are forced to do x. This obliterates a distinction between those who are forced
and those who are not, for they all supposedly act freely (because they exercise
their choice). This position, as the objection brings out, is untenable. To avoid
it, we must turn our attention away from the distinction between possessing and
exercising the power to choose and focus instead on the options between which
people choose. We should, that is, make sure we can resist the following
argument:
The plight of people who are allegedly ‘forced’ to do something may be
dismissed because such people could have chosen otherwise and are
therefore not actually forced to do what they claim they are forced to do.
That we are forced to choose x means that there were other options
available (otherwise we would not have had a choice, and without a
choice, we could not have been forced).Mark S. Peacock 30
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In what follows, I present a way of resisting this argument.
A condition of being forced to choose x is that none of the available options was
‘acceptable’ (Cohen 1988: 246, cf. 255-6). We may add to this condition a second,
namely, that being forced to choose x means that x was not itself a desirable
option (although it was probably the least undesirable available). If we return to
Smith and Jones, what makes Cohen’s scenario b) one in which Jones chooses to
leave the room is that he has an alternative – staying in the room and being shot
by Smith. For Jones, this is not an acceptable alternative and hence he leaves –
he is forced to leave; his act is intentional and he exercises his power to choose.
We may now address the utterance: ‘I didn’t have any choice’. The Jones of
scenario b) would be perfectly justified in saying: ‘I didn’t have any choice’. But
‘not having any choice’ does not mean that the person could not exercise her
power to choose (to do otherwise); rather it means that no other way of
exercising it was reasonable – she chose the least evil because it was ‘least
unacceptable’. Hence, ‘I didn’t have any choice’ is not to be taken literally but is
to be given the sense of ‘having no acceptable alternative to an undesirable
action’.
The foregoing raises a question about the meaning of ‘could have done otherwise’.
Here we must introduce a distinction between different ‘abilities to do
otherwise’, namely between the formal and the substantive ability to do
otherwise. To unlock this distinction, let us consider an example presented by
Nesbitt and Candlish (1973). A bank robber orders a bank teller at gunpoint to
‘hand over the money’; the bank teller obliges and empties the contents of his
cash till into the robber’s bag. Nesbitt and Candlish suggest that the teller could
not have done otherwise. They are correct if they mean he could not
substantively have done otherwise. They consider an objection to their view
which is expressed by saying: ‘What do you mean, couldn’t have done anything
else? He was quite capable of hanging onto the money, wasn’t he?’ (Nesbitt and
Candlish 1973) Formally (but not substantively), the objection is valid: the bank
teller could indeed have done otherwise, for ‘not being able to do otherwise’ does
not mean ‘being incapable of doing anything else’. That is, formally, the teller
has an option different to handing over the money, namely, refusing. But
considered substantively, the teller could not have done otherwise because ‘it
would have been unreasonable to have expected him to do anything else [except
hand over the money]’ (Nesbitt and Candlish 1973: 327). The other option facing
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ability to do otherwise and thus to exercise his power to choose is empty and
worthless. Hence we may say of the teller that he was forced to give the money to
the bank robber. Similarly, Dostoyevsky’s Sonya (Crime and Punishment) is
formally free not to become a prostitute – she has other options (one of which is
letting her consumptive mother and her siblings starve to death); but given the
unacceptability of these other options, she was forced into prostitution.
Cohen discusses the unemployed workers of Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Such
workers had alternatives to taking hazardous jobs with the mining corporation,
Beryllium, in the 1950s, and for some, these other options, e.g., leaving their
hometown and seeking work elsewhere or becoming unemployed, were
acceptable. But for other workers who cherished ties to their family, friends and
community, leaving Hazleton was an unacceptable option (as was remaining in
the ranks of the Hazleton unemployed). Such people might well have said that
they ‘had no choice’ but to work for Beryllium; what this means is that the other
options were unacceptable and so they accepted the hazardous job as a last resort
– they were forced to do so (Cohen 1988: 240-1, 250-1, 259); their formal freedom
to do otherwise was without consequence. Let us compare two hypothetical
workers, both unemployed and living in Hazleton. Their different values,
commitments and conceptions of the good life mean that only one is forced to
take a job. One, for example, might be forced to take a job at Beryllium because
he cannot give up his attachments to his community and family in Hazleton and
because he cannot accept the thought of being unemployed; these values and
attachments are not necessarily things he chose. The other worker might have no
attachment to community and family; she might find leaving Hazleton and
working elsewhere quite acceptable. The sorts of people we are and the
attachments and commitments we have determine what we can and cannot
substantively choose, what is acceptable and what not, and thus whether and
when we are forced to do things. Such commitments and attachments form non-
volitional determinants of our freedom.
There is an important difference between cases like Jones being forced to leave
the room by Smith’s threat toward him and the case of Beryllium. In the Jones
case, Smith performs an act (the threat to shoot Jones) which forces Jones to
leave the room. Smith’s action – we may call it an act of coercion – is
instrumental in bringing about Jones’ action. Beryllium, however, did not force
workers to work for it in the same way. Beryllium did not openly coerce workers
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circumstances the residents faced and made offers of employment which many
could ‘not refuse’. In the following subsection, I show how the foregoing analysis
can lead to the conceptualization of ‘exploitation’ in economics. Before turning
to this, though, I conclude this subsection with a historical example. It concerns
the presuppositions of capitalist production, as Marx describes them in his
discussion of ‘primitive accumulation’. Marx ([1867] 1972: 742) is concerned with
the freedom of those who, with the emergence of capitalism, become workers.
Under previous modes of production, such people were slaves or serfs, and upon
becoming workers they become free ‘in a double sense’. First, workers are not
directly bound to the means of production and do not belong to a slave-owner or
landlord; they therefore confront owners of the means of production as legal
equals and legally free agents. Second, workers are ‘free’ of the means of
production – ‘footloose and fancy free’ (‘los und ledig’), as Marx writes. Under
serfdom, by contrast, the means of production (land) were directly accessible to
them. Marx’s irony cannot be missed, here, and it plays on the distinction
between formal and substantive choice. Formally, wage workers are free to enter
into contractual relationships with capitalists as they please; they are formally
free to do otherwise. But in light of the divorce of the workers and the means of
production, workers’ formal freedom to choose whether to work, for whom, how
long, etc. is not translated into substantive freedom. Formally, that is, workers
have a choice, viz., to work or not to work for a capitalist. But not working for
a capitalist is an unacceptable option (and, in Marx’s time, entailed starvation);
hence, we may say that workers were forced to work for a capitalist – there is no
acceptable alternative. Although this lack of substantive freedom of choice does
not play a role in Marx’s notion of exploitation, in the following subsection, I
develop a notion of exploitation from the foregoing analysis of choice.
Implications for economic theory: conceptualizing exploitation
The term ‘exploitation’ plays little role in modern economic theory. [5] One
reason for this is that economists examine voluntary decisions, contractual
agreements such as employment decisions being paradigmatic examples.
Economists’ conceptualization of ‘voluntary’ rules out exploitation; for as a
condition of their rationality, individuals are deemed prudent enough not to
bind themselves to, or enter into, agreements which are exploitative. Although
rational choice theory imposes no a priori conditions on the relative shares of
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(expect to) be at least as well off after the transaction than before it takes place.
If all parties enter agreements because of the prospect of gain, none can
complain that she is exploited. The previous analysis suggests, to the contrary,
that exploitation has a place as a normative category of economics even if we
maintain the focus of analysis on voluntary decisions and agreements; for, as we
saw in the previous subsection, an agreement entered into voluntarily can be
exploitative if a person is forced into it, e.g., a decision to work for Beryllium.
Being forced into an agreement entails that there are no reasonable alternatives
to the (undesirable) option actually chosen. Even when there is no act of
coercion from a third party, it may be said that the agent was forced. Consider
an example. If an agent, A, is faced with a choice between (i) working for less
than one dollar a day in a factory in which health and safety conditions are
poor and (ii) being destitute, then there are grounds for saying that the agent’s
choice to work for that wage and under the stipulated conditions is both
rational and voluntary. One may also say that the employment relation is
exploitative. The example is relevant to the practice of multinational
corporations which employ workers in the developing world at far lower wages
and under worse conditions than their counterparts in the developed world. A
corporation which employs workers as depicted may be said to be exploiting the
situation of many workers whose only alternative – destitution – is so
unreasonable that they have ‘no choice’ but to work for the multinational in
question. The workers who choose to work for the corporation are, as rational
choice theory holds, better off accepting work than not, yet the gain to them
from doing so and the voluntary nature of their choice to work should not stop
us from censuring a corporation which employs people under such terms.
At a general level, there are two essential components to the claim that an agent
be exploited:
(a) Doing x is undesirable (hazardous, degrading, etc.) for agent A.
(b) A may have alternatives to x but none is “reasonable”.
Two remarks must be made in relation to this claim. First, that A is exploited is
compatible with A’s benefiting from x (vis-à-vis any available alternative to
doing x). Second, the undesirability of x suggests a ‘subjective’ element to the
notion of exploitation, namely A’s judgement that x be undesirable. One question
here is whether this subjective element be a necessary component of the theory.
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Peacock, Mark S. (2011) ‘The capacity to choose: reformulating the concept of choice in
economic theory’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, IV:2, 15-36
that she herself conceives of herself as being exploited? Or may external
observers judge A to be exploited even if A does not see herself in such terms? An
example of A being exploited without characterizing herself thus occurs when A
has become so inured to her lot that she accepts it without protest or negative
feeling. Indeed, the most successful kinds of exploitation are those in which the
exploited come to adapt to their condition and do not perceive themselves as
being exploited (cf. Sen 1999: 15). Consequently, an agent may be deemed
exploited even if he does not agree to this characterization of his situation.
Therefore it is not a necessary condition of being exploited that the exploited
person feels exploited. We must finally ask whether A’s subjective judgement
that she is exploited is a sufficient condition for correctly classifying her thus.
Clearly it is not a sufficient condition, for A’s feelings of disgruntlement and
dissatisfaction with her lot – however intense and genuinely felt – might belie
the ‘objective’ circumstances of her life. For instance, if A is excessively pampered
and spoilt, she might feel exploited at having to do the smallest household chore,
yet, if this is the sort of chore which normal people in A’s society are required to
do from time to time, A has little occasion to claim she is exploited; rather she is
probably engaged in an exercise of whining. There is clearly much more to be
said on this complex topic, but I take my leave of the discussion here, having
provided the rudiments of a theory of exploitation.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
To sum up, the distinction between possessing and exercising the capacity to
choose has not yielded a framework for analysing social scientifically
interesting cases of limited choice or force. Instead, being forced, or ‘having no
choice’ is best represented by Cohen’s Smith-Jones example (scenario b), by
Nesbitt and Candlish’s bank teller and by Marx’s emerging workers in the process
of primitive accumulation. Because they are all subject to force, they, of
necessity, have options between which they can choose. Hence, of none of them
may one say that they do not or cannot exercise their capacity to choose. Choose
they did, and what makes their situation one of force is that the options facing
them are all undesirable; but it is better to choose an undesirable option (leaving
the room, handing over the money or working for a capitalist) than to choose an
unacceptable option (being shot or starving to death). The theory of choice
worked out above grounds a notion of exploitation which economic theory, in its
current state, lacks.The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 35
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Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes
[1] This essay offers no general introduction to critical realism or to Lawson’s
work. The reader is recommended Lewis (2004) for a concise introduction.
[2] ‘Tends to cause’ because the exercise of an agent’s power will not necessarily
have an unmediated impact on events and hence actually cause Y; the workings
of the agent’s causal powers might be counteracted by other causal forces
operating conjointly with those of the agent in question. On tendencies, see
Lawson (1997: 22-3).
[3] Presumably he means either that he derives the existence of choice ‘ex post’ or
that the knowledge that choice exists is ‘a posteriori’.
[4] I describe the connection between choice and intentional human agency as
‘conceptually necessary’ because of Lawson’s use of ‘analytic’ which implies
conceptual rather than natural necessity. For the ascription of a naturally
necessary relation, Lawson would have to appeal to a posteriori scientific
knowledge about humans which, I have argued, he does not have.
[5] An exception is the work of experimental economists who characterize some
experimental subjects as ‘exploitation averse’ (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2005).
However, ‘exploitation’ here involves non-reciprocal behaviour on the part of
people whom one faces in social dilemma situations, e.g., the prisoners’ dilemma.
This is different from the notion I adopt in this section.
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